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Book Reviews
FREEDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

by Walter Berns.

Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. $4.00.
In an age when conflicting ideologies are competing for the
support of mankind and when constitutional issues regarding
civil liberties are dividing the American people in opposing
camps, there is likely to be a renaissance of critical and speculative thinking about fundamentals. Not all this thinking is of
high quality, as the refurbishing of the old doctrine of nullification and much of the so-called "neo-conservative" literature so
amply testify. Nevertheless, controversy brings thought, and
some of this thought will be of enduring value.
Walter Berns' Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment is
a notable example of the best kind of thought which controversy
can engender. It is a very important contribution to political
thought and will attract attention among social scientists for
many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it is a ringing challenge to the system of values which has dominated them.
One does not need the gift of prophecy to predict that this book
will be vigorously and widely attacked. It will likewise influence
the legal profession because its immediate concern is with court
decisions and the factors which influence them. Finally, it will
interest many people in the thinking public who are looking for
a truer and more adequate philosophical foundation for our constitutional democratic way of life.
In general the thesis of Berns' book is that no viable constitutional democracy or sound system of jurisprudence can be
based on freedom as the ultimate value of civil society. Freedom,
like happiness, is a by-product which is lost when it is treated
as an end in itself and which can thrive only in a good society.
Liberty can exist only within a moral context or it will cease
to be liberty, and it is something deserved rather than conferred
or interjected. Dr. Berns reaches this conclusion after a careful
analysis of court decisions dealing with freedom under the First
Amendment. One by one, he eliminates the principles which have
guided these decisions, particularly the clear and present danger
test of Holmes, the preferred position theory of Black and Douglas, and the Roscoe Pound theory of judicial decision as the
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reconciling of group interests and pressures with a minimum
of friction. He follows this up by an examination of the teachings of the leading thinkers of the liberal tradition and finds
them wanting because of this failure to give a central position
to justice and virtue.
In spite of the dire need of contemporary liberalism for an
adequate philosophical foundation, Dr. Berns' book will not be
pleasing to most liberals. One reason is that his thesis rejects
the relativistic philosophy which inspires so many liberals. Relativistic liberals do not believe that concepts like justice and
virtue can have any content other than the changing and variable
one derived from transitory conditions of time and place. For
that reason they will label this book as authoritarian and destructive of democracy.
Non-relativistic liberals, on the other hand, will also be in a
critical mood. They will regret the fact that Dr. Berns makes no
attempt to give substantive content to the concepts of justice
and virtue. It is obvious that he does not accept the content
which "competition in the market place" has put there, but he
offers no substitute. It is one thing to say that freedom requires a moral foundation; it is quite another to explain what
a moral foundation is. Dr. Berns rejects the "ideologies" of
"isms" as sources to which we should turn for an answer. The
two most obvious sources left are the Judeo-Christian tradition
and the Greco-Roman tradition. While he does not rule out the
former, he ignores it. The latter, however, commands his sympathy. And yet it is noteworthy that though he stresses justice,
he gives neither analysis nor endorsement to the greatest piece
of Greek thought on the subject, namely Plato's Republic. In
the case of virtue he does commend Aristotle, bbt only in general terms. His handling of Aristotle is curiously relativistic.
For example, he quite correctly states Aristotle's view on the
relation between a good man and a good citizen, but he does not
endorse the Greek philosopher's own concept of virtue.
It is, of course, true that the destruction of error is a contribution in itself because it prepares the way for something
better. In this case, however, the matter of content is urgent as
well as important. It is urgent because liberal values are everywhere ander attack, and liberal values are worth defending. If
virtue be accepted as the ultimate value of civil society, it is
only by spelling out in some detail what virtue is that its re-
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Slationship to "freedom can :become, clear., Only thus can one'-say
-whether in the;author's mind virtue would maximize or'miiiimize
freedom. But spelling itout is the same thing as committing
oneself to it. Without faith there 'can'be 'neither -virtuenor liberty, and faith, as Calvin said, is part knowledge and part.'commitment.
Dr. Berns -set a high, -though:notthelhighest, :value. on freedom. For that reason it is unfortunatethat he used"libertarian"
-and' "liberal" as interchangeable .synonyms. 'It wouldv have tbeen
fbetter to have reserved the'former to describe those -who make
,liberty the ultimate value and :the latter :for those who 'value
'-liberty..because of its part-in .the fulfillment, of :the: Greco-Roman
*idea, of a good life or the Christian idea .df the-nature iand destiny
of man. Such a discriminating use of terminology iwould o'have
saved him from. those neo-conservatives who .will mistakenly
clasp:him to their .bosom in, spite of what he said about them in
'his preface.
In conclusion, itis -the considered opinion df the :reviewer
,.thdt,'Fredom,Virtue, and the FirstAmendment.is,'abrilliant:con-tribution:to the zpoitical thought:of our.time. its logical reason:ing:is superb, Jts-thesis is sound'dand-:will in'ite.other rthinkers
'to embarkin 'a new ;and much morepromising-direction,,'a-nd its
.literary style lis :of 'the -very -finest :quality :in :clearness :and
relegance. Itis :to -be ..hoped that :this :book .is ,:only the first df
,several ,such contributions and will :place the )author :on the side
, of ,those whose -tolerance rests :on coniction :'Tather .than in'dif.ference:and:whose liberalism is affirmative ratherthan'negative.
.Rene-de Visme .Williamson*
THE'LION'AND'THE'THRONE-The Life and Times of Sir Edward
Coke '(1552-1634), by-Catherine Drinker Bowen; AtlanticLittle, Brown, 1956-1957. Pp. 652.
Those members of the American Bar Association who were
fortunate' enough recently 'to witness the opening ceremony of
the London 'meeting in 'Westminster 'Hall' 'were afforded a
"glimpse- 'f 'the background df -one of -the most -colorful and
'dynamicexpounders"6f'the common 'law. "For-inthatgreat Hall,
"'the'very -work-shop-of the 'law,"'Sir Edward' Coke, -as lawyer,
*Professor of. Government, Louisiana -State University.
1.',For an interesting, account; see-43A.,'B.A. J. 88 et seq." (1957).

